Abstract
Introduction
Security has become critical for robust software systems. Security requirements (SRs) should be considered in the early stage of software development life cycle (SDLC). However, security is managed in an ad-hoc fashion and as an afterthought. This leads to problems and serious design challenges [1] . Two of the reasons for poor security engineering are the lack of security knowledge of software developers and stakeholders [3] , and a gap existing between SRs analysis and security design;
In software engineering, requirement analysis methods analyze SRs from several aspects. Design methods embed security related information into system design. Product-oriented approaches evaluate if the final product satisfies the SRs. Process-oriented approaches define development steps to deliver security critical software. Agent-oriented software engineering methodologies are extended to address SRs. 
Notations and Background
The protocol where Alice sends a message to Bob is presented as: Alice Bob: message;
The security services (SSs) that make a protocol secure are confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication. In some cases, the freshness of a message should be guaranteed to prevent a replay attack. A random number, nonce, should be included as: Alice Bob:S Alice (msg, nonce).
STs support SSs. Digital signature (DS) achieves non-repudiation and integrity of the message and the authentication of the sender. Applying DS (with PKI) is represented as: Alice Bob:SAlice(msg); SAlice(msg) means that message msg is signed by the private key of Alice. Encryption ensures the confidentiality of a message. Asymmetric encryption (AE) is represented as: Alice Bob:{msg}KBob; {msg}KBob means that message msg is encrypted with Bob's public key; Symmetric encryption (SE) is represented as: Alice Bob:{msg}KSkey; {msg}KSKey means that message msg is encrypted with the secret key Key;
Method
1. Establish CP: after system goals and roles are specified in analysis phase [4] . Protocols are established to model how roles are involved to fulfill system goals. In this step, security issues at enterprise level (e.g. security policies, business rules/laws) are captured. In design phase, we define the agents that fulfill roles. Protocols are then refined by specifying the sequence of interactions among agents and the messages exchanged in each interaction.
2. Define SR: the security of a protocol is affected at two levels. First, at enterprise level, the protocol should be defined correctly. The sequence, the precondition, the post-condition of interaction and role/agent involved must comply with organization security concerns.
Second, at system level, transactions and the messages exchanged should be secured. In this step, we define SRs for the protocol at system level. Security attributes (SAs), integrity, confidentiality, availability, authentication, nonrepudiation and accountability, are the common features that a secure system should have [2] (and thus for a CP); therefore they imply the basic SRs for a protocol. Within the context of protocol, the first three are concerned with messages exchanged; the later three are concerned with transactions. General SRs for a protocol can be defined by attaching the first three SAs to each message exchanged and by attaching the three later SAs to each transaction of the protocol.
3. Enhance SRs into CP: this step bridges between SR analysis and security design bidirectionally. First, we apply corresponding STs to support the SRs defined for the protocol (see 1 st and 2 nd column in table1 1 ) Several STs can be available for one SR; developers/stakeholders decide based on advantages and disadvantages of a ST (see table2) and available project resources. Second, we analyze whether the protocol can be attacked and apply STs to avoid it when possible attack is found (see 3 rd and 2 nd column in table1). Table 2 . Security Technique Selection Example 1 Availability (readiness of a correct service or message) is not applicable in protocols because all the exchanged messages are available. Accountability (availability and integrity of the identity of the person who performed an operation) is out of protocol context, because once we ensure the integrity, the accountability is automatically satisfied. Thus they are not in table1.
Example
We demonstrate only steps 2 and 3 due to space limit. A correct CP with security issues captured at enterprise level is assumed to be available (see right part of Figure1). Alice submits advertisement (ads), auction due date, credit card information and minimum acceptable offer (limit) to auction web site (AWS). Bob requests ads (Request Ads), bids (Bid) for product and gives credit card information to AWS. AWS shows ads (Ads Info) and informs bid results (Bid accepted).
Figure 1. Fulfill SRs for Communication Protocol
We take the first transaction as an example. First, we define SRs by attaching SAs needed for the exchanged message and for the transition. Then we have SRs: Ads (integrity); DueDate (integrity); Credit Card (confidentiality, integrity); limit (confidentiality ,integrity); Alice AWS: Ads, Due Date, Credit Card, Limit (Non-repudiation), Second, we integrate security by applying proper ST. We use DS for nonrepudiation, integrity and AE for confidentiality. Besides, the freshness of the message should be guaranteed to prevent malicious intermediate users from re-submitting a message copy to AWS. Therefore we have: Alice AWS: SAlice(Ads, Due Date, nonce, {Credit Card, Limit}KAWS). For transaction: Bob AWS: Request Ads, no SR is required because both the message and the transaction are public. Left part of the figure1 shows the secured CP produced by our method.
Conclusion
We present a simple method for software engineers to enhance SRs into CP in multi-agent system. We can improve it by considering relationships among different roles/agents.
